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The idea that data owners on a common domain share their apply our protocol to privately discover association rules. Our data for the common good collides with privacy rights and protocol is more efficient than previous methods. The effects of the needs for security. Privacy concerns have been influencing our protocol are less than others: 1) each party can identify only ta ners and pentin them co havin maxium their data, 2) no party is able to learn the links between other data owners and preventing them from achieving maximum parties and their data, 3) no party learns any transactions of the benefits with data sharing. One common alternative is for other parties' databases.
data owners to sanitise their data and try to block as many inference channels as possible to prevent other parties from concluding what they consider sensitive. Data sanitization is defined as the process of making sensitive information in Intelligence usually refers to the gathering and analysis of non-production databases safe for wider visibility [11] and information to gain knowledge. In the current global climate, is practised as a main alternative to balancing privacy and Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining have become central security in collaborative exercises for association-rule mining. tools of this process [1] . Moreover, it is commonly the In this paper, we use the alternative to data sanitization, case that data-collection is performed by different agencies, usually referred as privacy-preserving data mining. In this organisations or governments with different jurisdictions and approach, the parties collaborate to a data mining task that mandates. Keeping the data of each party private while they will use as input the union of all the data sets of the interested engage in collaborative intelligence or data analysis exercises parties. They all will receive and benefit from the result, is an essential aspect of security as well. Recent meetings and that is why they contribute their data. However, the on Intelligence and Security Informatics directly addressed challenge is that no party learns much about another's party collaborative data mining that ensures privacy [2] [3] [4] . Among data except what can be inferred from the output. Many the core data mining tasks is association-rule mining.
researchers have produced algorithms for several data-mining In has been argued that collaboration for association-rule tasks, like classification (with decision trees [12] or by kmining between different agencies could hold the key to nearest neighbours [13]), or for clustering [14] , [15] . However, effective homeland security as these parties combine strengths many of this algorithms have not found implementations in different areas [5] . Association-rule mining in the context because most of them rely at some point on a theorem that says of several parties each holding some data is attractive in that a function f can be implemented in secure multi-party several privacy settings [6], [7] . When parties hold different computation (see Sec II-B) if it can be lay out as a circuit of attributes on common transactions is referred as mining a polynomial size. Coming up for such circuits, even for simple vertically partitioned database. Under this argument, several functions, has proven challenging, The next difficulty is that studies have proposed methods and approaches for association-the protocol is derived from splinting shares of the inputs and rule mining for vertically partitioned data [5] , [8] . However, outputs of the circuit's gates. the other common case is horizontally partitioned data, where
We address a core and important data mining task and prodifferent jurisdictions, or enterprises on a common domain, duce an efficient and practical implementation. We solve the hold common attributes but about different transactions. For issue of association-rule mining for horizontally-partitioned example, mobile phone companies hold very similar attributes data with a more efficient and implementable protocol. In the about their customers and their accounts, although they may next section we provide details of the context for this work. have a very different and almost disjoint set of customers We highlight some of the disadvantages of the data sanitization approach and its variants. Preliminaries are presented to un-other words, the more the distortion to block more inference derstand the context of our work before some new protocols. channels, the less accurate the results will be. In general, it has We then discuss the improvement the new protocol represents been demonstrated that in many cases random data distortion over previous work.
preserves very little privacy [25] . The alternative to providing distorted/noisy data is to pro-II. PRELIMINARIES vide the actual data. We achieve our claim for association-A. Data [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . This approach uses addition is performed to items in the antecedent part of the cryptographic tools to the problem of computing a datarule. Thus, the confidence of such a rule is reduced and enters mining task from distributed data sets, while keeping local the safe zone. The problem with this approach is that the addi-data private [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] . These tools allow parties to analyse tion of new items will create new rules and parties could share their data and achieve results without disclosure of the untrue knowledge (sets of items that are not frequent itemsets actual data. For [24] , and as it has been mining in secure multi-party computation (PPDM-SMC). pointed before, they always trade security for less confidence It is usually difficult to agree on a trusted party. The and accuracy in the results. Thus, when data owners share algorithms proposed to solve privacy-preserving tasks usually inaccurate data, they will end up with inaccurate results. And assume no trusted party, but assume a semi-honest model. since data owners are willing to share their data for the aim The semi-honest model is a more realistic abstraction of of enhancing their knowledge and intelligence, results with how parties would engage and participate in a collective poor confidence will guide them to incorrect decisions that computation while preserving each the privacy of their data. might have negative effects. The balance between privacy and accuracy on data-perturbation techniques depends on C. The sem-honest model modifying the data in a way that no party can reconstruct A semi-honest party is one who follows the protocol steps data of any individual transaction but the overall mining but feels free to deviate in between the steps to gain more results are somewhat valid and close to the exact ones. In knowledge and satisfy an independent agenda of interests. In other words, a semi-honest party follows the protocol step monly used. It can be used both for encryption and for by step and computes what needs to be computed based digital signatures. RSA computation takes place with integers on the input provided from the other parties, but it can do modulo n = p * q, for two large secret primes p and q. its own analysis during or after the protocol to compromise To encrypt a message m, it is exponentiated with a small privacy/security of other parties. It will not insert false infor-public exponent e. For decryption, the recipient of the ciphermation that will result in failure to compute the data mining text c =me (mod n) computes the multiplicative reverse result, but will use all the information gained to attempt to d = e`(mod(p -1) * (q -1)) (we require that e is selected infer or discover private values from the data sets of other suitably for it to exist) and obtains cd = me*d = m(modn). parties. Semi-honest parties will not collude with others or The private key consists of n, p, q, e, d (where p and q can be release partial results that the protocol determines as private. forgotten); the public key contains only of n, e. The problem A definition of security under the semi-honest model [38] for the attacker is that computing the reverse d of e is assumed formalises that whatever a semi-honest party learns from to be no easier than factorising n [39] . participating in the protocol, this information could be essen-
The key size (the size of the modulus) should be greater tially obtained from its inputs and its outputs. In particular, than 1024 bits (i.e. it should be of magnitude 10300) for a the definition models the computation with a probabilistic reasonable margin of security. Keys of size, say, 2048 bits functionality f : {0, 1}8 x {0, 1}8 1* {0, 1 }8 X {0, 1}* should give security for decades [42] . The proper implementation of the RSA algorithm with represents the ith message it has received. Then, we define redundancy is well explained in the PKCS standards (see that II can privately compute f, with respect to the first party, definitions at RSA Laboratories [43] ). The RSA algorithm if there exist a probabilistic polynomial time algorithms S1 should not be used in plain form. It is recommended that such that even if party two provides arbitrary answers during implementations follow the standard as this has also the addithe protocol, the corresponding view for the first party is the tional benefit of inter-operability with most major protocols. output of the algorithm S1 on the input x of the first party and the messages received by the first party. The protocol can III. STATEMENT OF THE PPROBLEM privately compute f if it can do so with respect to both parties.
We will provide two variants of our method. These variants The theory of this model [38] shows that to compute privately differ on what constitutes a record but are practical and effecunder the semi-honest model is also equivalent to compute tive privacy-preserving methods for the mining of association privately and securely.
rules. We will achieve this by later describing a protocol A fundamental tool to construct private and secure protocols COMBINE_WITHOUT_OWNER for the seemingly simple task as defined above is a public-key crypto-system. of bringing the data of all parties together while removing what record was contributed by whom. D. Public-key Crypto-systems (asymmetric ciphers)
The task of mining association rules over market basket Public-key crypto-system were invented in the late 1970's, data [44] is considered a core knowledge discovery activity along developments in complexity theory [39] , [40] . As a since it provides a useful mechanism for discovering correresult, crypto-systems could be developed which would have lations among items belonging to customer transactions in a two keys, a private key and a public key. With the public key, market-basket database. Let D be the database of transactions one could encrypt data, and decrypt them with the private key. and J = { JI, , Jn } be the set of items. A transaction T Thus, the owner of the private key would be the only one who includes one or more items in J (i.e., T C J). An association could decrypt the data, but anyone knowing the public key rule has the form X -* Y, where X and Y are non-empty could send them a message in private. Many of the public key sets of items (i.e. X C J, Y C J) such that X =Y 0. A set systems are also patented by private companies, this also limits X c J of items is called an itemset. words, the support s of an association rule X -* Y is the The RSA algorithm was described in 1977 [41] by percentage of transactions T in a database where X U Y C T. Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman at MIT; the letters The confidence or strength c for an association rule X -* Y is RSA are the initials of their surnames. RSA is currently the ratio of the number of transactions that contain X U Y to the most important public-key algorithm and the most com-the number of transactions that contain X. An itemset X C J is frequent if at least a fraction s of the transaction in a In the protocol the parties find global frequent itemsets in database contains X. Frequent itemsets are important because rounds of increasing cardinality as it happens with the Athey are the building block to obtain association rules with priori algorithm. That is, the parties execute the steps above to a given confidence and support. The distributed mining of find first the local frequent itemsets of size 1 in order to find association rules over horizontally partitioned data consists global frequent itemsets of size 1. This enables them to find of sites (parties) with homogeneous schema for records that global candidate itemsets of size two. Repeatedly, the parties consists of transactions.
find local frequent itemsets of size k using information on Our first solution uses the protocol COM-global frequent sets of size k -1 (and thus eliminating some BINE_WITHOUT_OWNER to bring all transactions together candidates). They share local frequent itemsets of size k with and then let each party apply an association-rule mining others for obtaining global itemsets of size k, and this enables algorithm (A-priori or FP-tree, for example) to extract the them to formulate global candidate itemset of size k + 1. association rules. This approach is reasonably secure for some We would like to emphasise two important aspect of our settings, but parties may learn about some transactions on solution in this application. The first is that, because the other parties. Ideally, it is desirable to obtain association rules protocol COMBINE_WITHOUT_OWNER does not require comwith support and confidence over the entire joint database mutative encryption, these solutions does not require commuwithout any party inspecting other parties transactions [9] . tative encryption. The second is that, because the protocol Computing association rules without disclosing individual COMBINE_WITHOUT_OWNER is more efficient, we require p transactions is possible using some global information. For exchanges of encrypted data between the parties less than the example, if one knows that 1) {A, B, C} is a global frequent previous algorithms for this task. itemset, 2) BINE_WITHOUT_OWNER to share records that consist applied to each row (record) of the database. Parties of the local frequent itemsets (and never transactions).
will need to know the common length of rows in the The parties also share the size of their local databases.
database. We denote the result of this encryption as The parties learn the union U of all locally frequent kpA(DBi) although the encryption is applied per row.
itemsets.
Note that, by the properties of public crypto-systems, 3) Pi recomputes the local count of all the itemsets in U.
only Alice can decrypt these databases. But if Alice and 4) For each itemset in U, the parties engage in SMPC Bob holdan identicalrecord r, if Alicepasses kpA(r) to of the sum of the local counts, and testing against Bob among the encryption of other records, because Bob the minimum required support. Those itemset that have also holds kpA(r), Bob would recognise the duplicate global frequency are announced to all parties.
record, although not the contents of the row. kpA(DB1) and kpA(DB2) before passing all this shuf-
We analysed the cost of RSA encryption in terms of fled rows to Carol (see Figure 1) .
computation, number of messages, and total size. For this 5) Carol adds and shuffles her rows kPA(DB3) to the analysis, we implemented RSA in Java to calculate the enrows received from Bob but removes duplicates (see cryption time of a message of size m = 64 bytes with Figure 2 ). encryption key of 1024-bits. This time was 0.001462 sec.
6) The protocol continues in this way, each subsequent on a 2.4MHz Pentium 4 under Windows. This is perfectly party receives a database with the encrypted and shuffled comparable with the practical computational cost suggested rows of all previous parties in the enumeration of the by earlier methods [9] . While some regards RSA as too slow parties. The i-th party mixes randomly its encrypted for encrypting large volumes of data [48], our implementation rows kpA(DBi) with the rest, removing any duplicates is particularly competitive. An evaluation of previous methin its rows, and passes the shuffled rows to the (i + 1)-th ods [9] suggested that (on distributed association rule mining party by a permutation only know by the i-th party.
parameters found in the literature [49] ), the total overhead was 7) The last party (in our illustration Carol) passes the approximately 800 seconds for databases with 1000 attributes transactions back to Alice (see Figure 2 ). and half a million transactions (on a 700MHz Pentium 3 
